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BEGGAR-THy-NEIGHBOR ADVERTISING: THEORY
AND ApPLICATION TO GENERIC COMMODITY
PROMOTION PROGRAMS
JULIAN M. ALSTON, JOHN W. FREEBAIRN, AND JENNIFER S. JAMES
Profits from generic advertising by a producer group often come partly at the expense of producers
of closely related commodities. The resulting tendency toward excessive advertising is exacerbated
by check-off funding. To analyze this beggar-thy-neighbor behavior we compare a scenario where
different producer groups cooperate and choose their advertising expenditures jointly to maximize
the sum of profits across the groups, and a scenario where they optimize independently. In an
illustrative example using 1998 data for U.S. beef and pork, the noncooperatively chosen expenditure
on beef and pork advertising is more than three times the cooperative optimum.
Key words: cooperative and noncooperative solutions, excessive advertising, mandated commodity
promotion programs, U.S. beef and pork.
In the United States, generic commodity pro-
motion programs spend around $1 billion
per year on domestic and export promo-
tion, funded mostly by commodity taxes, com-
monly referred to as check-offs (Vande Kamp
and Kaiser provide details). In recent years,
there have been numerous court cases and
other contention over whether such manda-
tory programs should be continued. These
disputes were driven by intraindustry effects:
the total benefits and costs and the distribu-
tion of costs and benefits among producers
and handlers of a given commodity covered
by a promotion program.
A potentially important issue that was
not addressed in the disputes is the effect
of such programs on producers of related
commodities, and on consumers. When the
promotion of a particular product success-
fully increases the demand for that prod-
uct, the demands for related commodities are
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likely to shift as well. l These cross-product
effects may occur as a result of price changes
induced by the demand increasing effect of
the advertising and by the cost increasing
effect of the levy to fund it, or because adver-
tising of one commodity directly reduces
the demand for another commodity. For
instance, when beef promotion leads to an
increase in demand and a rise in the price
of beef, there will be induced increases in
the demands for substitutes such as pork
and chicken, even if the advertising does not
affect pork and chicken demands directly.
In addition, however, beef promotion may
also cause a reduction in demand for pork
and poultry. Hence, beef advertising may
induce changes in the demands and thus
changes in the prices of all three goods,
which feed back into the demands, causing
a further round of demand shifts and price
changes. Producer groups need to consider
such cross-commodity feedback effects in
I Examples where generic commodity programs funded by
check-offs may have important cross-commodity impacts include
the programs for individual meats (such as beef and pork), but-
ter and margarine, individual nuts (such as almonds, walnuts, and
pistachios), individual dried fruits (such as prunes, apricots, and
raisins), and individual fresh fruits or groups of fresh fruits (such
as avocados, table grapes, citrus, and the stone fruits covered by
the "tree fruit agreement," namely peaches, pears, nectarines, and
plums). Forker and Ward, Lee et aI., and Vande Kamp and Kaiser
document many of these programs.
determining their own investments in product
promotion? The cross-commodity effects also
have implications for social welfare and for
appropriate policy? In the most likely case,
benefits to beef producers come partly at the
expense of producers of pork or chicken, but
the costs to pork and chicken producers will
be (rationally) ignored by beef producers in
deciding how much to spend on promotion.
In this article, we focus on this beggar-thy-
neighbor element, which is implicit when a
substantial part of the benefits to the pro-
ducers authorizing the program come at the
expense of producers of competing commodi-
ties. Such cross-commodity effects have been
noted in previous studies since the earliest
work on commodity advertising (e.g., Hoos;
Parish; De Boer; Piggott et al. 1996), but
until recently have not been analyzed. Sev-
eral recent studies have drawn attention to
the beggar-thy-neighbor aspect of commod-
ity promotion programs, and its potential
importance, but they all treated the adver-
tising expenditure and levy as exogenous
(e.g., Piggott, Piggott, and Wright; Piggott
1997; Alston, Chalfant, and Piggott 2000; and
Kinnucan and Miao). Here, we go a step fur-
ther and treat the advertising expenditure as
a choice variable.
Optimal advertising strategies are analyzed
under scenarios where producer groups act
noncooperatively or cooperatively in choos-
ing their advertising budgets. We allow for
own- and cross-commodity impacts of generic
commodity promotion programs in terms of
their effects on profits of producers of the
advertised commodity (and thus the optimal
promotion budget), and on profits of produc-
ers of substitute commodities.4 Throughout,
we assume competitive industries, with prices
determined by the intersection of supply and
demand, and collective action by producer
groups to undertake advertising. Initially, a
2 Intuitively, to account for such cross-commodity price feed-
back effects amounts essentially to using a Buse-type "total"
own-price elasticity of demand rather than a conventional
"partial" elasticity in the optimal advertising rule from a
single-market model. Such elasticities are discussed by Piggott
(1992).
3 Other than noting the effects on consumer prices and quan-
tities, no assessment of the consumer welfare effects of adver-
tising is considered in this article. Exactly how to measure the
consumer welfare effects of advertising is not fully resolved
(see Becker and Murphy for a general discussion and Alston,
Chalfant, and Piggott 1998 for some more-specifically relevant
discussion and empirical work).
4 Throughout the atricle we use the terms "optimal" advertising
expenditure or "optimal" advertising intensity as shorthand for
the expenditure or intensity that maximizes producer surplus or
the return to quasi-fixed factors.
multimarket equilibrium model is used to
derive qualitative results. Then, using data
and elasticity estimates for the U.S. meat
market, we illustrate the importance of the
beggar-thy-neighbor element in the case of
generic advertising of beef by the Beef Indus-
try Council and pork by the National Pork
Producers Council.
Optimal Advertising
We begin with a model of n goods related
in demand but not supply. The quantities and
prices of all of the goods (Qi' P;, for i = 1
to n) are jointly endogenous and determined
competitively, given the generic advertising
expenditures (Ai) chosen by each of m pro-
ducer groups (m ::s n). The equations for
demand and supply, for i = 1, ... , n, are5
(1) Qi = di(PI,P2"",Pn,AI,A2,···,Am)
(2) Qi = Si(PiP )
where PzP is the producer price, which may
differ from the buyer price P; depending
on the method used to fund the advertising.
Under lump-sum funding, PzP = P; and Ai
does not depend directly on price or quantity.
Under ad valorem check-off funding, PzP =
(1 - ti)P; and Ai = tiP;Qi' Under per unit
check-off funding, ~.p = P; - Ti and Ai =
T;Qi'
Noncooperative Advertising with
Lump-Sum Funding
Initially, we assume the advertising is funded
in a lump-sum fashion. For each group of
producers, i, profits, 7fi , are equal to total
revenue, P;di(·), minus total variable cost
of production, TVCi(Qi(')) and the cost of
advertising, Ai' so that6
(3) tfi = Pidi(PI , P2, ... , Pn, AI'
A2, ... , Am) - TVCi(Qi(')) - Ai'
Suppose group i chooses Ai to maximize its
profit, as defined in equation (3), treating the
5 For simplicity, we refer to demand in (1) as farm-level
demand. Strictly, advertising is at the retail level, and a market-
ing margin separates retail and farm levels. With additional com-
plexity, the model could be extended to include a marketing sec-
tor as illustrated, for example, by Kinnucan (1997). The analysis
could also be extended readily to allow for interdependencies in
production.
6 Under the assumption of a competitive industry, the supply
function in equation (2) is the marginal cost from the total vari-
able cost of production, TVCiCQiC·)), used in defining producer
profit in equation (3).
advertising expenditures by all other groups
as given. Then the first-order necessary con-
dition for a maximum is
(9) L == (E - H)-l n.
where
supply of good i]. H is an n x n matrix of
elasticities of demand with respect to prices
[the typical element l1ij == (adi(·)/aPj)(Pj/Qi)
is the elasticity of demand for good i with
respect to the price of good j], n is an
n x m matrix of elasticities of demand with
respect to advertising [the typical element
aij == (adi(·)/aAj)(Aj/Qi) is the elasticity of
demand for good i wIth respect to advertising
of good j], p is an n-vector of proportional
changes in prices (i.e., dIn P;), and a is an
m-vector of proportional changes in advertis-
ing expenditures (i.e., dIn A i).8
Premultiplying both sides of equation (7)
by (E-H)-l yields the vector of proportional
changes in prices as a function of the propor-
tional changes in advertising expenditures
(8) p == (E - H)-l nit == La
Q aPi = 1
laA i
(5)
(4)
where price has been set equal to marginal
cost (i.e., P; == aTVCi/aQi)' as an implication
of competition.7 Equation (4) can be written
equivalently as
dIn P; Ai
dlnAi PiQ i
To solve for the profit-maximizing value
for Ai in equation (5), first we differentiate
the equilibrium conditions for the n markets,
taking into account that the price of each
good may change as a result of the adver-
tising choice made by the group of interest.
The equilibrium condition in the ith market
is defined by
Totally differentiating the n market equilib-
rium conditions and converting into elasticity
terms, we get
Then, using the assumption that
d In Ai / d In A j 0, the elements of L rep-
resent the own- and cross-commodity elas-
ticities of prices with respect to advertising:
d In ~ / d In A j == L ij • The diagonal elements
represent the own-price effects of advertis-
ing, given fixed advertising by other groups:
dIn P; / d In Ai == L ii . Setting this term for
each of the m groups equal to its advertising
intensity, as given by the first-order condi-
tions, equation (5), and transforming yields a
set of m simultaneous equations that implic-
itly define the m advertising expenditures:
(10) A~ == ~QiLii'
The solution to this system of equations
defines the noncooperative equilibrium in
terms of the supply and demand parameters.
1111 1112 111n
l1n 1122 112n
l1nl l1n2 ... l1nn
all a12 alm
an a22 a2m
x
o 0 ... En
dlnP1
dlnP2
x
or, more compactly,
(7) (E - H)p == n it
Cooperative Advertising with
Lump-Sum Funding
In contrast to the optImIzation problem
presented above, suppose producer groups
where E is a diagonal matrix of sup-
ply elasticities [the typical element Ei
(aSi(·)/a~·)(~/Qi) > 0 is the elasticity of
7 For completeness, we also assume there are non-negative
profits from advertising, that in the vicinity of the solution to
the maximum we have diminishing returns to advertising (i.e.,
a2Qi/aAT :::: 0), and that the demand and supply equations have
the usual regularity properties.
i\ Economic theory implies restrictions on these matrices of
elasticities. Symmetry and homogeneity restrictions apply to the
matrix of demand elasticities, H. Further, if the model covers the
expenditure on all of the goods in the relevant group (either all
of current-period consumption expenditure, or expenditure on all
of the goods in a separable group) the budget constraint implies
a restriction that the share-weighted sum of advertising elastici-
ties across the goods in the group is equal to zero-i.e., advertis-
ing causes a reallocation of a given total budget (M) but cannot
change the total budget (Basmann). That is, w'n = 0, where w is
an n-vector of budget shares with typical element a'i = Pi Qi / M.
cooperate and choose the advertising expen-
ditures At through Am jointly in order to
maximize the sum of their profits:
m
(11) 11" = L 11"i
i=t
= I:[p;di (PI , ... , Pn, AI' ... ,Am)
i=t
- TVCJQi(·» - AJ
Taking the derivatives of the profit function
with respect to At through Am and setting
those derivatives equal to zero, we get m first-
order conditions, for i = 1 to m,
map·(12) L Qj_J = 1
j=t aAi
which can be written equivalently as
Hence, the solutions for the cooperative
advertising budgets are implicitly defined
using the d In Pi / d In A j = L ij terms from
equation (9), as the solution to the m simul-
taneous equations, for i = 1 to m:
m
(14) Af = L PjQjL ji ·
j=t
The noncooperative solution, defined by
equation (10), can be seen as a special
case of the cooperative solution, defined by
equation (14), which holds when all of the
cross-price effects of advertising are zero (i.e.,
dln~/dlnAj = L ij = a for i =1= j). When
these terms are not zero, the cooperative and
noncooperative solutions will be different. In
either case, the right-hand sides of equations
(10) and (14) include revenue terms (PiQi)
that are functions of the entire vector of
advertising expenditures. In order to deter-
mine explicit solutions for At through Am'
under either cooperative or noncooperative
arrangements for lump-sum funded generic
advertising, specific demand functions must
be specified, and the revenue terms must be
substituted out of the expressions to obtain
solutions for At through Am as functions of
the parameters of the model.
Advertising Funded by Per Unit and
Ad Valorem Check-Offs
When commodity advertising is funded
through a per unit check-off, Ti , total adver-
tising on the commodity is Ai = TiQi' and the
quantity of that check-off is chosen in order
to maximize profits, where profit for group i
is defined as
(15) 11"i = (Pi-Ti)d/Pt,···,Pn,At,···,Am)
-TVC/Q/·)).
Taking the derivative of group i's profit func-
tion with respect to Ti and setting it equal to
zero, we get the first-order condition
(16) ap; = 1
aI:
which can be written equivalently as
dln~ Ti(17)
dIn Ti ~
The value of the first-order condition in
equation (17) is determined by totally differ-
entiating the market equilibrium conditions
and solving for d In Pi / d In Ti • Along with
identities equating supply and demand, the
equilibrium conditions now include identities
relating total advertising expenditure by each
group to the check-off chosen:
(18) Si(Pi - Ti) = di(Pt , ... , Pn,
At,··· ,Am)
(19) Ai = TiQi.
For the case where advertising is funded
using a check-off specified on an ad valorem
basis, the solution is found similarly, but with
s/(l - ti)~) and Ai = ti~Qi.
The type of funding mechanism plays an
important role in determining the optimal
advertising expenditure. In a single-market
model, when the advertising is funded by
a check-off rather than lump sum, some of
the cost of advertising is borne by con-
sumers; with lump-sum funding, the final
incidence is entirely on producers. Conse-
quently, ceteris paribus a producer group's
optimal advertising expenditure will tend to
be greater under check-off funding.9 This
9 This relationship between optimal advertising expenditure
rules for producer groups under check-offs versus lump-sum
funding in the single-market case was demonstrated by Alston,
Carman, and Chalfant.
holds for both per unit and proportional
(ad valorem) check-offs. In a multimarket
setting, the funding mechanism for advertis-
ing has further implications, because collec-
tion of the check-off has cross-commodity
price implications-another form of shifting
incidence - as well as distributional implica-
tions between producers and consumers of
the commodity being taxed.
A Two-Market Example
In order to demonstrate the nature of the
market interactions more clearly with explicit
solutions, in this section we use a model of
the interaction between two producer groups
(i.e., for m == n == 2). To derive con-
crete results, we impose additional assump-
tions about elasticities and functional forms.
We assume that the two goods are gross sub-
stitutes in consumption (i.e., aQi/aPj > 0),
the own-commodity effect of advertising on
demand is positive (i.e., aQi/aAi > 0), and
the cross-commodity effect of advertising on
demand is negative (i.e., aQi/aAj < 0). The
own-commodity effect must give rise to an
increase in the own-commodity price (i.e.,
a~/aAi > 0), if it is to be profitable for
the producer group paying for the adver-
tising. Even with these restrictive assump-
tions, advertising by each group of producers
may be inimical or favorable to the interests
of the other group, depending on whether
the (negative) direct cross-commodity effect
of advertising exceeds the (positive) indirect
cross-commodity price effect, which comes
from the advertising-induced increase in the
price of the advertised good.
Noncooperative Advertising with
Lump-Sum Funding
In modeling the noncooperative case for
two goods, we interpret the solutions in
equation (10) as a pair of reaction func-
tions, which express each group's optimal
advertising expenditure as a function of the
other group's advertising expenditure: Ar ==
R1(A2) and Ai = R2(A 1). Our focus is on the
case where these reaction functions are nega-
tively sloped, aAr/aA2 < 0 and aAi/aAl < o.
Then, the equilibrium is defined by the inter-
section of the two reaction functions. In the
case of two goods, we can write equation (10)
as
(20) A I = PI Ql (-) [ (Xli (E2 - 11~) + (X21 1112 ]
(21) A 2 = P2Q2(O{ (X22(E1 -~)+ (X121121]
where D == (El - 1111)( E2 - 1122) - 11121121'
and D > 0 is implied by regularity condi-
tions (a sufficient condition is that both goods
are normal, with positive income elasticities,
and positive supply elasticities; see Kinnucan
1996). Because group 1 takes into account
that Ql in equation (20) depends on both Al
and A 2 , the optimal solution for Al depends on
A 2 (and conversely for group 2).10
Because the Qi terms on the RHS of
equations (20) and (21) are functions of Al
and A 2 , functional forms for the demand
equations must be specified in order to derive
explicit solutions for the two reaction func-
tions. We consider the case of constant elas-
ticity demand and supply functions, where the
market relationships are defined by
(22) Qf = rJiPIllil p211i2 A~i1 A;i2
(23) Qf == ~i~Ei.
By substituting the demand functions into
equations (20) and (21), and using the equi-
librium conditions to eliminate prices from
these expressions, we obtained an expression
for optimal advertising by group 1 as a func-
tion of advertising by group 2 and parame-
ters of the model- the reaction function for
group 1,
where F == (1 +E I)[CX211112 +cxll (E2-1122)], and
K I is a positive constant, defined by
10 Note that, if all of the cross-elasticities were zero, equations
(20) and (21) would reduce to the equivalent of the Nerlove and
Waugh result: Ai! PiQi = aii!(Ei - T1ii)' Assuming a fixed sup-
ply (Ei = 0), these conditions would reduce further to the Dorf-
man and Steiner result for optimal advertising by a monopoly:
Ail PiQi = -aii/Tlii'
A2a •..................................................................................................................................................................=~
A2b •............................................................................................,. ·i·:.:.;.--k=··································"-
o AIL Ala Alb A 1H
Figure 1. Reaction curves and isoprofit contours
Such reaction functions will usually be down-
ward sloping. In this case, the slope of the
reaction function for group 1 is
(26) aAj (1 + El )[<:~lZ(EZ - 'TIzz) + uzz'TId
aA2 D - F
Al
X A
2
•
This expression will be negative for most
reasonable elasticity values.ll In particular, it
I I The conditions for a positive denominator of equation (26),
i.e., D > F, include
EI> <Xll + TIll and E2 -Tl22 > Tl21 + <X21 (1 +EI) .
I-<Xll Tll2 EI-Tlll-<Xll(1+EI)
The first of these conditions will be met when ITIll I > <Xll and
<Xll < 1, which make the RHS of the inequality negative~ <Xll < 1
is implied by our maintained assumption of diminishing marginal
can be seen that when the cross-commodity
advertising effect is large relative to the
cross-commodity price feedback effect, the
reaction function will slope down.
The noncooperative equilibrium is given by
the intersection of the reaction curves for
the two groups of producers. Figure 1 shows
returns to advertising. The second condition will generally be
met under likely elasticity conditions: ITlnl > Tll2 makes the LHS
greater than one, and <XII> I<X21 I and ITIll I > Tl21 make the RHS
less than one. The sign of the numerator of the slope term will
be determined by the inequality
<X12 <Xn
-- > ---.
Tll2 E2 - TIn
When the above inequality holds as written, and the denominator
is positive (i.e., D > F), the reaction function slopes down. When
the inequality is reversed, the reaction function slopes up, and
advertising expenditures are strategic complements rather than
substitutes.
oFigure 2. Noncooperative and cooperative equilibria
the reaction curve for producers of good 1,
R1(A2 ). At any point along RI (A2 ), for a
given advertising expenditure by group 2
(A 2 ), the corresponding quantity of adver-
tising by group 1, Al == R I (A2 ), measured
along the horizontal axis, maximizes the prof-
its to producers of good 1. Thus, for instance,
at point a, the profit-maximizing advertising
expenditure for group 1 is Af when group 2's
advertising expenditure is A~.
The isoprofit contour, 1Tf, is the locus of
combinations of Al and A 2 that would yield
the same profit to producers of good 1 as
earned at point a. This curve is concave, with
a maximum at point a (by definition). For
every point along R} (A 2 ), a similar isoprofit
contour reaches its maximum as it passes
through the reaction function, such as the
curves through points b, C, and d, which rep-
resent successively higher profits for produc-
ers of good 1 (because they are associated
with lower advertising expenditures by pro-
ducers of good 2).
Figure 2 replicates figure 1 and includes
the corresponding reaction curve of group 2,
R2(A I ), and two isoprofit contours for
group 2. A noncooperative equilibrium in this
situation is defined by the intersection of the
two reaction curves, as depicted by point N in
figure 2. At this point, each group's advertis-
ing expenditure is optimized, given the other
group's expenditure, a stable Nash equilib-
rium. The isoprofit contours passing through
point N in figure 2 indicate that producers of
good 1 are obtaining profit of 1T~, and pro-
ducers of good 2 are obtaining profit of 7ff.
The cross-hatched area formed by the two
isoprofit frontiers is a lens of mutual advan-
tage, which contains all of the combinations
of Al and A 2 , where both groups of produc-
ers could be made better off relative to the
Nash equilibrium at point N, if they both
reduced their advertising expenditures.
Cooperative Advertising with
Lump-Sum Funding
In the cooperative case, Al and A 2 are cho-
sen jointly by the two producer groups to
maximize the sum of their profits, and the
first-order conditions given in equation (14)
reduce to
(27) Af =PtQtO[ al1(€2 -~)+a211]12]
+P
2
Qi o )[ a21(€t -~)+al11]2t]
(28) Af =PtQtO[ a12(€2-1]~)+a221]t2]
+P2Q20[ a22(€t -~)+a121]21J
To determine explicit solutions for Al and A 2 ,
specific demand functions must be specified,
and the price terms must be substituted out
of the expressions to obtain solutions for Af
and Ai as functions of the parameters of the
model.
In this cooperative setting, where producer
groups work together to maximize the sum
of their profits, the optimum will be found
at a tangency between isoprofit contours. For
instance, in figure 2, the solution might be
at a point such as C, where group 1 would
earn 1T C > 1Tf, and group 2 would earn
1Tf > 1T~, which represents a Pareto improve-
ment relative to point N. The locus of such
tangency points is the contract curve. Points
on that curve and inside the lens represent
Pareto improvements relative to point N.
Other points on the contract curve outside
the lens achieve higher profits for one group
at the expense of the other group and might
entail higher total profits than any point
within the lens (that is, the cooperative opti-
mum might lie outside the lens). This would
be a case where maximizing the total profit
would involve a reduction in profit for one
of the groups relative to point N, a poten-
tial Pareto improvement. To be feasible, this
would require a lump-sum transfer to com-
pensate the group experiencing a loss.
Advertising Funded by an
Ad Valorem Check-Off
Solutions for the optimal tax rates (t l and
t2 ) for the case of m = n = 2 and advertis-
ing funded by an ad valorem check-off (Ai =
ti~Qi) are
[
<X22 [ <X 11 (1 + EI) + TIll - EI] ]
(30) t
2
= au[a 21 (1 + €t) + 1]2tl
[
- Tl22[<X ll (1 + El) + TIll - E I ]]
+ TlI2[ <X 21 (1 + El) + Tl2I]'
The tax rates depend generally on the key
parameters in the same ways as advertising
expenditures do. Notice, however, that the
two tax rates (which, as it happens, are also
the advertising intensities-ti = Ail~Qi) are
independent of one another, and of prices
and quantities: they depend only on the elas-
ticities. The same is also true of the advertis-
ing intensities implied by equations (20) and
(21) in the case of lump-sum funding. In both
cases, the optimal advertising intensities are
constant for the constant-elasticity functional
form considered here. For other functional
forms, advertising intensities will vary as the
elasticity values vary.
Because the two goods are gross substi-
tutes in consumption, the collection of a
check-off on good 1 results in an increase
in its price, and consequently an increase in
the demand for good 2-each group ben-
efits when the other taxes its own market.
On the other hand, when a group spends its
tax money on advertising the other group is
disadvantaged through beggar-thy-neighbor
effects. For a given amount of advertising,
the tax collection effect mitigates the beggar-
thy-neighbor effect and might even outweigh
it, turning goods that were strategic adver-
tising substitutes under lump-sum funding
into strategic advertising complements under
check-off funding. In general, however, the
effect of shifting of the cost of advertising
to consumers is expected to be more impor-
tant than any cross-commodity implications
of the check-off funding (versus lump-sum
funding) so that the net effect of check-off
funding is to cause each group to advertise
Table 1. Elasticities of Demand with Respect to Price and
Advertising
With Respect to
Price of Advertising of
Elasticity of
Demand for Beef Pork Poultry Other Beef Pork
Beef -0.56 0.10 0.05 0.41 0.00050 -0.00023
Pork 0.23 -0.69 0.04 0.42 -0.00043 0.00050
Poultry 0.21 0.07 -0.33 0.05 -0.00043 -0.00023
Source: Price elasticities were taken from Brester and Schroeder (p. (77). Advertising elasticities were derived
from authors' calculations.
more, exacerbating the beggar-thy-neighbor
problem. This conjecture is evaluated in the
simulation experiments, reported below.
Simulation Results: U.S. Beef and
Pork Promotion
In the two-good case, our theoretical results
suggest that each producer group is likely
to advertise to a greater extent than the
other would prefer, and the total producer
surplus will be less than if the groups were
amalgamated into one (or were organized
otherwise to act so as to maximize the sum
of producer surpluses without regard to its
distribution). We use numerical simulation
methods to explore the potential importance
of these cross-commodity effects, and the dif-
ferences between the single-commodity and
joint optima in a model of the market for
meat. Elasticities and other parameters were
defined to represent U.S. beef, pork, poul-
try (combining chicken and turkey), and
a fourth composite good representing "all
other goods." Our focus is on the meat indus-
try, and we treat the price of the fourth good
as being exogenous. Hence, we only need to
model explicitly the markets for the three
meats.
Parameter Values and Model Specification
Base values for own-price elasticities of sup-
ply for beef and pork were taken from
Wohlgenant, and we assumed that the sup-
ply elasticity for poultry would be equal
to that of pork: i.e., EB == 0.15, Ep ==
0.40, EC == 0.40. Table 1 shows a base set
of values for elasticities of demand with
respect to prices and advertising, for U.S.
beef (B), pork (P), poultry (C), and "other"
goods (0). The price elasticities were taken
from Brester and Schroeder. The advertising
elasticities were developed in consideration
of the estimates in the literature - including
Ward and Lambert, Wohlgenant, Brester and
Schroeder, Kinnucan et aI., Piggott (1997),
and Coulibaly and Brorsen - which reveals
a large range of advertising elasticities and
considerable fragility of individual estimates.
We defined elasticities such that the val-
ues would be mutually consistent and would
imply advertising intensities in the range
of the actual intensities. First, we set the
own-advertising elasticity of demand for
beef equal to 0.0005. Then, to define val-
ues that would be mutually consistent, we
assumed that the cross-commodity elastici-
ties of demand with respect to beef adver-
tising would be equal for pork and poultry,
assumed zero effect on the "other" good, and
imposed the adding-up restriction to solve for
the cross-elasticities; similarly for pork adver-
tising. Table 2 shows the actual retail prices
and quantities consumed, estimated advertis-
ing expenditures in 1998, and the implied
advertising intensities.
The elasticity values and price and quantity
data for 1998 were used to initialize supply
and demand functions, of the constant elas-
ticity form, for beef, pork, and poultry, treat-
ing the nonmeat good's price and total spend-
ing on the four goods as exogenous. Given
these demand and supply specifications, the
producer groups' profits were defined as TIi ==
PiQi/(l + E i ), for i == B, P, and C. We
used the Solver routine in Excel to find the
noncooperative and cooperative equilibria.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the optimal advertising expen-
ditures for each of the two producer groups,
and the corresponding advertising intensities
and benefits from advertising under three
Table 2. U.S. Meat Consumption, Price, and Generic Advertis-
ing Expenditures, 1998
Advertising Advertising
Consumption Price Expenditure Intensity
Meat (million pounds) ($ per pound) ($ million) (percent)
Beef 18,412.10 2.77 25.51 0.05
Pork 14,207.01 2.43 13.79 0.04
Poultry 24,600.42 1.03 0 0
Source: Prices and quantities were provided by Nick Piggott in an updated version of the series used in his
dissertation (Piggott 1997). Advertising expenditures were estimated by multiplying the actual advertising
intensities from 1994 to the total revenue for 1998.
behavioral assumptions. Under noncooper-
ative competition, advertising expenditures
are chosen independently. Under cooperation
between the producer groups, advertising
expenditures are chosen jointly to maximize
the sum of profits to either beef and pork
producers, or beef, pork, and poultry produc-
ers. In addition, we show the sums across
the two groups of advertising expenditures
(and the corresponding aggregate advertis-
ing intensity, given by the sum of the beef
and pork advertising expenditures as a per-
centage of the combined value of beef and
pork sales) and the changes in total prof-
Table 3. Effects of Funding Methods and Behavioral Assumptions on Optimal Advertising
Variable
of
Interest
Noncooperative
Competition
Beef and Pork
Producers
Cooperate
Beef, Pork, and
Poultry Producers
Cooperate
23.47 12.48
0.00 0.00
23.47 12.48
0.05 0.02
0.00 0.00
0.03 0.01
656 647
-319 -313
-35 -28
338 334
303 306
246
33
-291
279
-13
Lump-sum funding
Optimal advertising expenditure ($ million/year)
Beef producers 32.44
Pork producers 13.28
Total beef and pork 45.72
Optimal advertising intensities (percent of revenue)
Beef producers 0.06
Pork producers 0.04
Total beef and pork 0.05
Benefits from advertisinga ($ million/year)
Beef producers
Pork producers
Poultry producers
Beef and pork producers
All producers
Ad valorem check-off funding
Optimal advertising expenditure ($ million/year)
Beef producers 41.77
Pork producers 21.47
Total beef and pork 63.24
Optimal advertising intensities (percent of revenue)
Beef producers 0.08
Pork producers 0.06
Total beef and pork 0.07
Benefits from advertisinga ($ million/year)
Beef producers 248
Pork producers 38
Poultry producers -296
Beef and pork producers 287
All producers -9
31.43 17.59
0.00 0.00
31.43 17.59
0.06 0.03
0.00 0.00
0.04 0.02
647 639
-304 -299
-48 -42
343 339
294 297
a Measured as the change in profit relative to the equilibrium with beef and pork advertising approximately equal to zero.
its relative to a scenario without any generic
advertising. These effects are shown for two
types of funding: lump-sum funding in the
upper half of the table, and funding by ad val-
orem check-offs in the lower half of the
table. The simulated advertising intensities
(and expenditures) in table 3 under noncoop-
erative behavior are similar to the observed
values given in table 2.
The results in table 3 show the quantita-
tive importance of the beggar-thy-neighbor
effects. First, to see the effects of different
forms of competition under lump-sum fund-
ing, consider the upper half of the table. Beef
producers would spend much more on adver-
tising ($32 million, 0.06% of revenue) under
noncooperative competition than the amount
that would maximize joint profits with pork
producers ($23 million, 0.05 % of revenue)
or, even more so, the amount that would
maximize joint profits with pork and poultry
producers ($12 million, 0.02% of revenue).
For pork producers the relationship is in the
same direction but more pronounced: they
would spend a significant sum on advertis-
ing under noncooperative competition ($13
million, 0.04 % of revenue) but would not
advertise at all in either of the cooperative
scenarios. Considering the combined expen-
diture of beef and pork producers, in the
noncooperative case collectively they would
spend $46 million (0.05 % of revenue). In the
cooperative case they would spend $23 mil-
lion (0.030/0 of revenue) to maximize their
combined profits ignoring poultry producers,
or $12 million (0.01 % of revenue) if they
maximized joint profits including poultry pro-
ducer profits. Looking at the lower half of
the table, the same pattern across behavioral
assumptions can be seen when advertising is
funded by an ad valorem check-off.
Second, compare the different types of
funding. The optimal expenditure on adver-
tising is much greater when it is funded by
a check-off (and part of the costs are borne
by consumers) than when it is funded as a
lump sum (with all of the costs borne by pro-
ducers), regardless of the assumptions made
about producer behavior, for both groups
and in aggregate. In the noncooperative case,
check-off funding implies total expenditure
of $63 million on beef and pork promo-
tion, and in the cooperative cases, $31 mil-
lion when poultry producer profits are not
considered or $18 million when they are-in
each case, substantially more than under
lump-sum funding.
Lastly, table 3 includes figures for the
annual changes in producer profits (mea-
sured as producer surplus) relative to a no-
advertising base for each combination of
funding method and assumption about pro-
ducer behavior. In this part of the table it
can be seen that beef and pork producer
profits from advertising come at least partly
at the expense of poultry producers. In the
noncooperative case there is a net loss to
meat producers as a group (the losses to
poultry producers exceed the gains to beef
and pork producers), $13 million per year
under lump-sum funding or $9 million per
year under check-off funding. Compared with
the noncooperative scenario, in either of the
cooperative scenarios, profits are greater for
beef producers and for the aggregate of beef
and pork producers or the aggregate includ-
ing poultry producers as welL but lower for
pork producers- hence, this cooperative out-
come would require a lump-sum transfer
from beef producers to pork producers (or to
pork producers and poultry producers) to be
feasible.
Comparing the cooperative and nonco-
operative scenarios, the difference in total
profits (across all producers) from generic
advertising is a measure of the producer loss
from beggar-thy-neighbor behavior: under
lump-sum funding, a loss of $13 million
per year compared with a potential gain
of $306 million per year; under check-off
funding, a loss of $9 million per year com-
pared with a potential gain of $297 million
per year.
Alternative Parameter Values
The results in table 3 were based on some
best-estimate parameter values. To explore
the model relationships further, we con-
ducted some limited experiments with the
advertising elasticities in the case of ad val-
orem check-off funding. Table 4 shows the
differences in optimal beef advertising check-
off rates (or advertising intensities) implied
by the thirty-two different elasticity combi-
nations obtained by using either the initial
value or half the initial value for each of the
other five advertising elasticities, while hold-
ing the own-advertising elasticity of demand
for beef (i.e., 0. BB) constant at its initial value.
Each column corresponds to a different set
of values for cross-elasticities with respect to
beef advertising, and each row corresponds to
Table 4. Sensitivity of Noncooperative Beef Check-otT Rates to Advertising Elasticity
Values
(XBB = 0.00050*
(XPB = -0.00043* (XPB = -0.00021
(XCB (XCB (XCB (XCB
= -0.00043* = -0.00021 = -0.00043* = -0.00021
(XBP (XCP = -0.00023* 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
(Xpp = -0.00023* (XCP = -0.00011 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
= 0.00050* (XBP (XCP = -0.00023* 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
= -0.00011 (XCP = -0.00011 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
(XBP (XCP = -0.00023* 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
(Xpp = -0.00023* (XCP = -0.00011 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
= 0.00025 (XBP (XCP = -0.00023* 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
= -0.00011 (XCP = -0.00011 0.0819 0.0849 0.0858 0.0888
Note: * indicates the base parameter values from table 1.
a different set of values for elasticities with
respect to pork advertising.12
The noncooperative beef check-off rates in
table 4 are generally not very sensitive to
advertising elasticities. Specifically, for a given
set of elasticities of demand with respect to
beef advertising, changes in the elasticities of
demand with respect to pork advertising do
not affect the optimal noncooperative beef
check-off rate (i.e., the intensities in each col-
umn are all equal). And, comparing across
columns, when we hold the own-advertising
elasticity (i.e., a BB) constant at its base value,
halving either of the cross-commodity elas-
ticities (i.e., a PB or aCB) gives rise to a
small increase in the optimal intensity, which
increases by less than one-tenth, even when
we halve both the cross-elasticities.
The optimal beef advertising intensities for
the case where beef, pork, and poultry pro-
ducers cooperate to maximize the sum of
their profits are shown in table 5 for elas-
ticity values that correspond to those used
in table 4. The cooperative advertising inten-
sities are always smaller than their nonco-
operative counterparts, and more sensitive
to elasticities-especially the elasticities of
demand with respect to beef advertising, as
can be seen by comparing across columns
in table 5. When the parameters are at
their base values, the cooperative intensity
is 0.03420/0 (compared with 0.08190/0 in the
12 Note that when we allow the elasticities to vary indepen-
dently, we are no longer imposing the restriction that the
weighted average of the elasticities must sum to zero, and we
run a risk of defining a nonsensical combination of elasticities.
To minimize this type of problem we held the own-advertising
elasticity constant for beef and reduced the others in turn.
noncooperative scenario). Halving either of
the cross-commodity elasticities of demand
with respect to beef advertising (i.e., apB
or aCB) results in a substantial increase in
the intensity, to about 0.060/0; halving both
results in a cooperative intensity of 0.0853 0/0,
quite close to its noncooperative counterpart
of 0.08880/0. Not surprisingly, the cooperative
advertising intensities are larger when the
negative direct effects of beef advertising in
the pork and poultry markets are reduced. In
other words, the beggar-thy-neighbor effects
are smaller when the direct cross-market
effects of beef advertising are smaller. The
cooperative intensities also vary a little more
than their noncooperative counterparts when
different values are used for the elasticities
with respect to pork advertising (i.e., here,
intensities vary among rows of a column, as
well as across columns), but as in the non-
cooperative case, these effects are compara-
tively small.
The entries in table 6 are ratios of the
optimal beef advertising intensity under non-
cooperative behavior to the corresponding
intensity under cooperative behavior (max-
imizing the sum of profits to beef, pork,
and poultry producers), for each elasticity
combination. The extent to which this ratio
exceeds one indicates the degree of over-
spending on advertising from the collective
viewpoint. The ratio is essentially constant
within each column of table 6 but varies
quite substantially across columns; hence the
degree of overspending is not sensitive to
elasticities of demand with respect to pork
advertising but is sensitive to elasticities of
demand with respect to beef advertising. In
Table 5. Sensitivity of Beef Check-otT Rates to Advertising Elasticity Values, for the Case
Where Beef, Pork, and Poultry Producers Cooperate
o.BB == 0.00050*
o.pB == -0.00043* o.pB == -0.00021
o.CB o.CB o.cs o.cs
== -0.00043* == -0.00021 == -0.00043* == -0.00021
o.BP o.CP == -0.00023* 0.0342 0.0601 0.0594 0.0853
o.PP == -0.00023* o.CP == -0.00011 0.0343 0.0601 0.0596 0.0853
== 0.00050* o.BP o.CP == -0.00023* 0.0338 0.0597 0.0594 0.0853
== -0.00011 o.CP == -0.00011 0.0337 0.0596 0.0594 0.0853
o.BP o.CP == -0.00023* 0.0340 0.0599 0.0594 0.0853
o.PP == -0.00023* o.CP == -0.00011 0.0342 0.0600 0.0595 0.0853
== 0.00025 o.BP o.CP == -0.00023* 0.0338 0.0598 0.0593 0.0853
== -0.00011 o.CP == -0.00011 0.0340 0.0599 0.0594 0.0853
Note: * indicates the base parameter values from table 1.
the base case (the left-hand column), the non-
cooperative advertising intensity is 2.4 times
the cooperative optimum-roughly speaking,
overspending by 1400/0. If we halve either of
the cross-elasticities, the extent of overspend-
ing is reduced to 400/0 and if we halve both
of them, it is reduced to 40/0.
Clearly, the relative sizes of the direct
effects of advertising in the different mar-
kets are important in determining the beggar-
thy-neighbor effect. When the direct negative
effects of beef advertising are small relative
to the own-market effects (i.e., the last col-
umn), the beggar-thy-neighbor effects are
small. But to create these scenarios with rel-
atively small cross-commodity effects we had
to abandon our adding-up condition within
the group of meats and implicitly introduce
a relatively large negative cross-commodity
effect of beef advertising on the nonmeat
group. Even though some of the resulting
elasticity combinations might not be plausi-
ble, the general sensitivity of the beggar-thy-
neighbor element to the relative sizes of own-
and cross-commodity advertising elasticities
adds to our reasons for wanting more reliable
estimates of these elasticities.
Conclusion
Marketing-order type arrangements for col-
lective action are predicated on the view
that there are market failures in the pro-
vision of certain types of public or collec-
tive goods. In-principle arguments support
collective action in the provision of things
such as applied research, grades and stan-
Table 6. Sensitivity of Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Effects in Beef Advertising to the Sizes of the
Advertising Elasticities
0. SS == 0.00050*
o.pB == -0.00043* apB = -0.00021
o.cs o.cs o.cs o.cs
= -0.00043* = -0.00021 = -0.00043* == -0.00021
o.sp o.CP == -0.00023* 2.3946 1.4112 1.4437 1.0403
o.PP = -0.00023* o.CP == -0.00011 2.3834 1.4113 1.4402 1.0408
= 0.00050* o.sp o.CP == -0.00023* 2.4243 1.4225 1.4435 1.0412
= -0.00011 acp == -0.00011 2.4252 1.4233 1.4432 1.0412
o.sp o.CP == -0.00023* 2.4064 1.4158 1.4445 1.0412
o.PP = -0.00023* o.CP == -0.00011 2.3961 1.4152 1.4411 1.0409
= 0.00025 o.sp o.CP = -0.00023* 2.4203 1.4183 1.4473 1.0413
= -0.00011 o.CP = -0.00011 2.4095 1.4176 1.4434 1.0411
Note: * indicates the hase parameter values from tahle 1.
dards, and market information. It is less clear
that, absent government intervention, the pri-
vate sector would underinvest from soci-
ety's viewpoint in generic commodity adver-
tising and promotion. Measurement issues
aside, some of the potential effects of com-
modity promotion are ill-defined with cur-
rent methods (those on consumer welfare)
and others are ambiguous (those on produc-
ers of related goods). Nevertheless, the pol-
icy prescription has been to create institu-
tional arrangements for collective action in
commodity promotion, funded by check-offs,
mandated by plebiscite.
Even if there were an underinvestment
otherwise, our analysis indicates that the cure
(collective action under mandated programs)
may be worse than the disease (individual
underinvestment from the collective view-
point). Once a marketing order is estab-
lished, individual producer groups are likely
to over- or underinvest in promotion from
the viewpoint of a larger group, including
producers of related commodities. Whether
the interaction effects are positive or negative
depends on elasticities, and plausible elas-
ticity values are consistent with either case.
In a case of strategic complements, there is
an underinvestment in advertising from the
point of view of producers as a group. How-
ever, strategic substitutes are more likely,
and in this case, excessive advertising is
an implication of noncooperative decision-
making between competing producer groups.
Finally, any tendency toward excessive
advertising is exacerbated under check-
off funding, whereby producers shift some
of the costs of financing promotion onto
consumers.
In our empirical example, the beggar-thy-
neighbor effects were large. Our results imply
that more care should be taken in authorizing
generic promotion programs. In determin-
ing whether to approve particular programs,
specific consideration ought to be given to
the extent of the beggar-thy-neighbor aspect,
if the relevant criterion is net benefits to
all producers. The existence of beggar-thy-
neighbor effects need not mean a program
should be disallowed-a program may still
yield net benefits to producers as a group,
even though it involves too much promotion
and lower benefits than if the interests of
all affected producers had been considered.
In such a situation, the question is how to
achieve a more nearly socially optimal out-
come. Given the difficulty of measuring the
effects of promotion, rather than devise reg-
ulatory solutions, we might seek to structure
the institutions such that effects were more
nearly fully internalized.
[Received April 2000;
accepted March 2001.J
References
Alston, 1M., R.F. Carman, and lA. Chalfant.
"Evaluating Primary Product Promotion: The
Returns to Generic Advertising by a Pro-
ducer Cooperative in a Small, Open Econ-
omy." Promotion in the Marketing Mix: What
Works, Where and Why. E.W. Goddard and
D.S. Taylor, eds., pp. 145-67. Guelph Canada:
University of Guelph, 1994.
Alston, 1M., lA. Chalfant, and N.E. Piggott.
"Advertising and Consumer Welfare." Mimeo,
Department of Agr. and Resour. Econ.,
University of California, Davis, 1998.
--. "The Incidence of the Costs and Benefits
of Generic Advertising." Amer. J Agr. Econ.
82(August 2000):665-71.
Basmann, R.L. "A Theory of Demand with Vari-
able Consumer Preferences." Econometrica
24(January 1956):47-58.
Becker, G.S., and K.M. Murphy. "A Simple Theory
of Advertising as a Good or Bad." Quart. 1
Econ. 108(November 1993):941-64.
Brester, G.W., and T.C. Schroeder. "The Impacts
of Brand and Generic Advertising on Meat
Demand." Amer. J Agr. Econ. 77(November
1995):969-79.
Buse, R.C. "Total Elasticities-A Predictive
Device." 1 Farm Econ. 40(November 1958):
881-91.
Coulibaly, N. and B.W. Brorsen. "Explaining the
Differences between Two Previous Meat
Generic Advertising Studies." Agribusiness
15(Autumn 1999):501-15.
De Boer, A.I "Rural Product Promotion: Eco-
nomic Aspects of Promotability, Organization
and Public Assistance." Rev. Mktg. Agr. Econ.
45(December 1977):121-45.
Dorfman, R., and ~O. Steiner. "Optimal Advertis-
ing and Optimal Quality." Amer. Econ. Rev.
44(December 1954):826-36.
Forker, O.D., and R.W. Ward. Commodity Adver-
tising: The Economics and Measurement of
Generic Programs. New York: Lexington
Books, 1993.
Hoos, S. "The Advertising and Promotion of Farm
Products: Some Theoretical Issues." 1. Farm
Econ. 41(May 1959):349-63.
Kinnucan, H.W. "A Note on Measuring Returns to
Generic Advertising in Interrelated Markets."
1. Agr. Econ. 47(May 1996):261-67.
--. "Middlemen Behaviour and Generic Adver-
tising Rents in Competitive Interrelated
Industries." Austral. 1. Agr. Resour. Econ.
41(June 1997):191-207.
Kinnucan, H.W., and Y. Miao. "Distributional
Impacts of Generic Advertising on Related
Commodity Markets." Amer. 1. Agr. Econ.
82(August 2000):672-78.
Kinnucan, H.W., H. Xiao, C.-J. Hsia, and
J.D. Jackson. "Effects of Health Informa-
tion and Generic Advertising on U.S. Meat
Demand." Amer. 1. Agr. Econ. 79(February
1997):13-23.
Lee, H., J.M. Alston, H.F. Carman, and W. Sutton.
Mandated Marketing Programs for Cali-
fornia Commodities. Giannini Foundation
Information Series No. 96-1. Oakland CA:
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, University of California, 1996.
Nerlove, M., and F.V. Waugh. "Advertising without
Supply Control: Some Implications of a Study
of the Advertising of Oranges." 1. Farm Econ.
43(November 1961):813-37.
Parish, R.M. "Possibilities for Promoting Farm
Products." Austral. 1. Agr. Econ. 7(June 1963):
27-34.
Piggott, N.E. "The Benefits and Costs of Generic
Advertising of Agricultural Commodities."
PhD dissertation, University of California,
Davis, 1997.
Piggott, N.E., lA. Chalfant, 1M. Alston, and
G.R. Griffith. "Demand Response to Adver-
tising in the Australian Meat Industry." Anler.
J. Agr. Econ. 78(May 1996):268-79.
Piggott, R.R. "Some Old Truths Revisited." Aus-
tral. 1. Agr. Econ. 36(August 1992):117-40.
Piggott, R.R., N.E. Piggott, and V.E. Wright.
"Approximating Farm-Level Returns to Incre-
mental Advertising Expenditure: Methods and
an Application to the Australian Meat Indus-
try." Amer. 1. Agr. Econ. 77(August 1995):
497-511.
Vande Kamp, ~R., and H.M. Kaiser. "Commod-
ity Promotion Programs in the United States."
Res. Bull. 99-01, National Institute for Com-
modity Promotion Research and Evaluation,
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and
Managerial Economics, Cornell University,
1999.
Ward, R.W., and C. Lambert. "Generic Promotion
of Beef: Measuring the Impact of the U.S.
Beef Checkoff." 1. Agr. Econ. 44(September
1993):456-65.
Wohlgenant, M.K. "Distribution of Gains from
Research and Promotion in Multi-stage Pro-
duction Systems: The Case of the U.S. Beef
and Pork Industries." Amer. 1. Agr. Econ.
75(August 1993):642-51.
